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Chapter 1: The Raid That Went Horribly Right​[1]​

	In the night of February 13, 1945 the RAF attacked Dresden from the air. The following two days the Americans performed air raids on Dresden too. The stated aim was to destroy transport from and to the city, but neither a bridge nor the railroads were the target: the city centre was. British Bomber Command had for some time attempted to recreate the firestorm they had caused in Hamburg in 1943 and in Dresden they succeeded. Eight hundred aircraft of the RAF Bomber Command dropped their bombs above Dresden; 650,000 of these bombs were incendiaries, specifically designed to set the city on fire (Grayling 72). In the subsequently developing firestorm the temperature exceeded 1,800 degrees Fahrenheit (Lindqvist 102). A month after the raid, on 15 March 1945, the Final Report by the Dresden police indicated that “18,375 [had] fallen” (Evans 175). Since then the death toll has been adjusted to 25,000 to include the bodies discovered afterwards. This number is thought to be the closest approximation of the lives lost in the raid on Dresden, which encompasses four raids spread out over three days. The aerial attack on Dresden was a part of the moral bombing campaign of the British. Moral bombing is a rather benign expression for what is considered “the official term for attacks aimed at civilian populations” (Grayling 21). How the decision was made to implement this strategy and how the British, Americans, and Germans were involved in the bombing of Dresden is important, because their reports shaped how the raid was later represented in literature and society.
In World War II the Germans, Americans, but especially the British made use of a strategy of air warfare called moral bombing. This strategy was initially adopted by the British, because “it was the only way of intervening in the war at all” (Sebald 17). In the early stages of the war this was true. The British mostly bombed during the night, which made it more difficult for the German air defences to spot them, but it also affected the ability of the British bombers to locate their targets. The RAF had enormous problems with “navigation and bomb-aiming” (Grayling 27) under these circumstances. However, an attack such as the one on Dresden in 1945 would not have been possibly in the beginning of the war. The British simply did not possess the material and trained personnel for devastating area bombings at that time. In the last months of the war, Britain did have the material needed and despite being then able to perform relatively accurate precision bombing they still opted to stick with their established strategy of bombing entire cities. That is how Dresden became a victim of the reluctance of the British to revert to precision bombing.
One of the principal aims of moral bombing was, as the name implies, to destroy enemy morale. Curiously, as Frederic Jameson points out, moral bombing has nothing to do with ethics, only with morale (1544). The idea that indiscriminate bombing would negatively affect morale was based on the “Douhet-Trenchard thesis” (Grayling 131) and it advocated a theory that Giulio Douhet had set out in his book The Command of the Air. Douhet was an Italian General in the early part of the twentieth century and as such he was privy to some of the early successes and failures of air warfare (Grayling 129-30). Douhet became convinced that driven by the will to survive the population under attack would force their government to surrender (57-8). Sir Hugh Trenchard, who played an enormous role in forming the RAF and the RAF policy for aerial bombing, was a firm believer in Douhet’s theory (Grayling 131). When, at the end of August 1940, the British bombed Berlin, the attack largely failed and material damage was minimal, but morale was observed to take a steep dive (Grayling 38). However, the decline in morale could largely be attributed to the fact that Berlin had not been bombed before and when the RAF started its devastating moral bombing offensive in 1944 “morale did the exact opposite, rising not falling” (Grayling 38). Civilian bombing had little to no effect on civilian morale, it was “even indeed counterproductive” (Grayling 103) and the British had witnessed this effect in their own country. London had been subjected to bombing during the Blitz. Though the accounts of morale in London after the attack vary, from morale did not collapse (Cooper 166) to “[m]orale was suffering tremendously,” (Friedrich 57) the bombing did not result in a civilian outcry against the war. On the contrary, Vera Brittain, who had suffered the effects of the Blitz herself, argued that “obliteration bombing” (7) only angered the civilians and would over the short term generate a demand for revenge (10). However, Trenchard was convinced that the Germans lacked the courage of the British (Friedrich 65). Therefore, the people responsible for the aerial bombing policy continued to believe with every new raid that this would be the one that would cause the Germans to surrender. 
While the morale of the Germans was under attack, the reports of the razing of German cities simultaneously boosted the morale of the British population. W.G. Sebald points out that the news of the successes of moral bombing were “essential for bolstering British morale,” (18) but also that the raids were criticised in Britain (14). Britain had a Bombing Restriction Committee and two spokespeople in the House of Lords, who spoke out against bombing campaign, namely Lord Salisbury and Bishop George Bell (Sebald 14). This display of resistance to wilfully causing civilian casualties shared by a part of the British public is probably the reason why the British “government insisted on publicly denying any indiscriminate bombing of civilian centers” (Friedrich 79-80). This strategy of denial began long before the worst crimes of aerial warfare were committed in the last months of the war. After the war the denial continued. The British museums reflect the wartime attitude of the British government perfectly. Sven Lindqvist explains how in 1998 he visited a large number of war museums in Britain and the horrifying effects of moral bombing on people were “never shown” (183). The image Britain wants to conserve of Bomber Command’s efforts in the Second World War, is that “[t]he targets of Bomber Command [were] always military,” (Hastings 202) just as Air Secretary Sinclair had claimed in 1943. 
The British were so busy speculating about the significance of morale in war that they failed to see the moral dilemma their moral bombing campaign posed. Arthur Harris, Commander in Chief of RAF Bomber Command, was convinced that the bombing offensive spared the lives of Allied soldiers, who otherwise would have died in ground attacks (176). However, the question of whether it was ethically sound to sacrifice the lives of civilians to spare the lives of soldiers apparently never occurred to the Allies. In the Second World War around 45 million of the casualties were non-combatants opposed to 15 million deaths amongst combatants (Chickering 3). These numbers testify to the new and frightening reality of total war: a concept wherein civilians have become viable targets. Furthermore, the truth is that when the heaviest bombing took place and the majority of the bombs were dropped “the war was already palpably won” (Grayling 104) and the defeat of Germany was imminent. A.C. Grayling agrees that “Bomber Command’s readiness for its major moral bombing campaign coincided with the turn of the tide in the Allies’ favour” (262) and the ground attacks that could have cost Allied lives would most likely not have been necessary even without the bombing. Yet, in the first four months of 1945, e.g. Bomber Command “dropped a mammoth 181,000 tons” (Grayling 104) of bombs and February 1945 was designated “the month of leftover operations” (Friedrich 237). Dresden was only one of many cities targeted, but it has become one of the prime examples of why moral bombing is condemned today.
Dresden was also bombed in an attempt to impress the Russians. In the last months of the war the Russians were approaching Germany from the east and RAF Bomber Command was eager to show them the havoc they could wreak. Dropping the two atom bombs in Japan was partly done so the Americans could show off their advanced weaponry to the Russians; Frederick Taylor discerns a similar intention behind the bombing of Dresden. An RAF memo issued before the attack baldly states this ulterior motive to “show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do” (Taylor, Dresden, 406). Thus, 25,000 civilians were killed in the raid on Dresden, to a certain degree because of the desire of the British to impress the Russians. 
Though the Americans also believed that moral bombing would impair civilian morale, they largely adhered to their policy of precision bombing. The USAAF targeted mainly “electricity, transport, and oil” (Grayling 136). This is what separated the air warfare policy of the Americans from the British: the USAAF’s intention was to perform precision bombing and when possible they did (Grayling 141-2). Whether the American strategy was affected as much by humane convictions as by the simple truth that they did not possess the material for moral bombing and that precision bombing was cheaper (Grayling 139) is dubious. In addition, the legitimate targets for precision bombing were, according to the academic historian Stewart Ross, broadly defined as “any city with a population over 50,000” (Grayling 141) and the combination of the weather conditions in Europe and the strong German air defence were not conducive to precision bombing (Grayling 140-1). Consequently, the precision bombing of the Americans at times did not differ greatly from moral bombing and at other times it was not possible to stick to their preferred strategy. It was in their attempts to keep the effects of moral bombing from the public that the Americans behaved exactly like the British.
The Nazis considered morale as important as the British and Americans did, so at first they reported minimally about the destruction done to German cities, because they were afraid the news would cause morale to plummet. Under the direction of Joseph Goebbels a radically different tactic was later employed for the bombing of Dresden. Instead of downplaying the damages and losses suffered in the raid, German propaganda focused on inciting the anger of Germans and vilifying the British in the eyes of the world. To achieve this goal the death toll was grossly inflated to emphasise the atrocity of the attack and to illustrate how diabolical their enemies were, especially the British. An official German report called TB (Tagesbefehl) 47, which was leaked to the foreign press by Goebbels (Evans 165), cited the number of deaths in Dresden after the attack as 202,040 (Evans 162). TB 47 was pure Nazi propaganda and was falsified by adding a zero (Evans 178-179). The death toll estimated at the time was actually 20,204. The neutral press was shocked by the numbers reported in this forged estimate. After the war the raid on Dresden was similarly appropriated and “exploited in the official rhetoric of the East German State” (Sebald 79-80). Despite the fact that the death toll of the bombardment of Dresden is now officially estimated at 25,000 it is doubtful that anything approaching accuracy will ever be reached. The Nazis have sown enough doubt to keep the controversy alive forever and revisionists take advantage of the uncertainty regarding the numbers of deaths that were the result of the raids.
Perhaps the most baffling defence of moral bombing is that it was too expensive to not continue with the strategy. The British war industry reached its peak just when the war was essentially won and the aircraft and bombs were no longer needed in such enormous quantities. To waste what had already been manufactured “ran counter to any healthy economic instinct” (Sebald 18) and consequently the bombing continued, heavier than ever. The Americans agreed with the British as is evidenced by an interview from 1952 with Brigadier Frederick L. Anderson of the U.S. Eighth Army Air Force, wherein he admits that it was inconceivable to not use the bombs, because they were “expensive items” (Kluge 79). 





















Chapter 2: Sebald’s Approach

W.G. Sebald condemns the bombing of German cities during the Second World War in his essay “Air War and Literature,” but he unwittingly undermines his criticism when he accepts that the Germans are partly to blame. He states that the Germans provoked the attacks and that the Germans would have done the same to the Allies if they had possessed the means. Lectures upon which the essay was based were given by Sebald in Zurich in 1997 and the essay was published in 1999. At the time, the debate about the bombing of Germany was much more focused on whether the Nazis’ misdeeds prevented the Germans from being portrayed as suffering under the Allied attacks, than it was on the ethics of the bombing campaign itself. Sebald was aware of this, yet unsuccessfully tried to quickly separate the issues. He points out that in the beginning of the war moral bombing was the only means available for the Allies to enter the war (Sebald 17). Sebald chooses not to delve deeply into the desire to destroy morale (17) and to end the war sooner (17), neither of which moral bombing accomplished (17), nor the role that its relatively less complex nature compared to precision bombing played in the decision making of the Allies (17). These factors influenced the decision to implement the moral bombing strategy only marginally and the actual motives for the campaign lie elsewhere, according to Sebald. Firstly, Sebald argues that contrary to the German wartime industry, whose input was decreasing immensely in the last months of the war, the British production of bombs and aircrafts was gaining momentum (18). Towards the end of the war bombs were being manufactured faster than they could be dropped. Thus, the aircraft and bombs had to either be used or go to waste. In addition, Sebald thinks the enormous propaganda value of the destruction and devastation was a reason to continue the bombing (18). While the campaign did not impact German morale as hoped, it did bolster the morale of the British population. The British leaders could have adopted precision bombing too, but destroying weapon factories and oil refineries was probably less newsworthy and triumphant than levelling entire cities and killing the German population in the process. Even years after the Second World War Sebald observes a curious chasm between an appreciation for the enormity and efficiency of the bombing strategy and revulsion because of the pointless attacks and the victims it made (15). These hardly adequate motives for moral bombing are scathing to the extreme, yet, perhaps partly because he is German, Sebald feels forced to place part of the blame squarely with the Germans.
Sebald thinks that many Germans feel they are to blame for the bombing of their cities and that this blame is born out of shame. This shame probably prompts Sebald to weaken his argument against the ethics of moral bombing: stating that ultimately the Germans ultimately had only themselves to blame for the destruction of their cities. The collective shame over the Holocaust plays a part in why German literature has failed to represent the bombings adequately. For whatever reason it seems necessary for anyone who questions the morality of the Allied bombing of Germany to explain that they do not mean to excuse the Holocaust. The two are connected, of course, though less as is commonly assumed, since the real horrors of the Holocaust mostly became known after Germany was defeated. Thus, it was not a quid pro quo situation, since the Allied bombing could not have been conceived as a revenge for the gas chambers, nor was it. More importantly, constantly measuring the bombing campaign against the bigger atrocity of the Holocaust diminishes the crimes committed by the British and Americans. If the Nazis were so horrible then why are their crimes always used as excuses for the crimes of their enemies? At the end of “Air War and Literature” Sebald assumes that Göring and Hitler would have employed a similar bombing campaign if they had been able to (103-104). The assumption is based on a meeting between Albert Speer and Hitler, where Hitler dreams about destroying London with bombs (Sebald 103). Additionally, Sebald names “Guernica, Warsaw, Belgrade, Rotterdam” (104) as examples of what the Germans did before the Allies began bombing them. However, it is when Sebald states that the Germans “provoked the annihilation of the cities” (104) that he almost completely forgoes the responsibility of the Allied forces for the raids. However, the Germans undoubtedly felt that they were partly responsible for the bombing of their country. It was the shame over the Holocaust that caused them to assume this responsibility and Sebald argues this is also what led to the lack of literature about the raids.
The primary criticism in Sebald’s essay, therefore, is not directed against the bombing of German cities, but against the shame that prevented German writers from writing about the raids. In fact, Sebald provides two explanations for the inability and unwillingness of Germans to write about what the Allies forces did to their country. The inability stems from the trauma of the experience and this will be discussed in chapter four. The reluctance is due to the atrocities the Nazis committed in the Second World War. This “collective shame” (Whitehead 117) they experience over the Holocaust is the burden of most Germans; Sebald also felt his share of it. Sebald argues that the Germans felt they were not qualified to question or expose the indiscriminate attacks on their cities, because they had done far worse things. This shame led to an absence of literature about the raids and a veritable paper silence about the experience of living after the devastation of the Second World War. Sebald asserts that, aside from a few exceptions, German writers have largely ignored the effects of moral bombing on Germany. Sebald heavily criticises German literature for its lack of representation of the horror during the bombings and life in the ruins after the attacks, while also harshly dismissing the work of some writers who have ventured to write about this subject. 
The shame fuelled the silence and this in turn prevented the Germans’ experiences from being mourned. According to Whitehead, Sebald, who was born during the death throes of Hitler’s Germany, “grew up haunted by an unspoken sense of collective shame” (117). A.C. Grayling acquiesces that generations of Germans and the nation as a whole were burdened by a sense of guilt about the Holocaust, which coloured their perception of the bombings of their cities to the point where they regarded the raids as just retribution (115). Sebald encountered a similar attitude towards the attacks (14). This shame made Germans hesitant to publicise their own sufferings, because they felt they could not claim to also be victims when they had so clearly been the main perpetrators. Mendieta draws a parallel between their unwillingness to accept the “anti-Semitism of German society” (9) and their subsequent failure to see how their actions against the Jews had in turn victimised themselves (9). This underlying motivation proffered by Sebald for the lack of representation of the Allied raids and their devastating results explains the peculiar dichotomy in his thesis. If trauma is the cause of the silence then the Germans can hardly be blamed, but if shame has led to playing dumb about this part of German history then the Germans “actively forgot or repressed their experiences” (Long 14). In a 1990 collection about the results of bombing in Europe, observations are made, that according to Sebald, “until then had been almost completely ignored in Germany” (7-9). The country was much more focused on rebuilding after the destruction and this looking forward did not permit also looking backward (Sebald 7). Sebald deems that even accounts written about the aftermath of the bombing were geared towards an “individual and collective amnesia” (10). It is not the true forgetting sometimes associated with trauma, but a purposeful and deliberate forgetting simply because the memory is unpleasant and stirs up other unpleasant memories because of the Germans’ own wrongdoings in the war. When surveying the German literary landscape Sebald is unable to conclude anything other than that there was “a persistent avoidance of the subject, or an aversion to it” (93). One of his examples features a forgotten book by Gert Ledig, which described the depravity of war and bombing and living in the ruins in gruesome details, and whose literary merit Sebald is unable to comment on (94). Nonetheless, Sebald feels safe to proclaim that the book was quickly forgotten mainly because its description of the war “went beyond anything Germans were willing to read about their recent past” (94). The closest Sebald comes to providing significant evidence for the collective shame is when he remarks that after the firestorm in Dresden 6,865 corpses were burned “by an SS detachment which had gained its experience at Treblinka” (98). It is indeed difficult for a nation to lament the destruction of its cities and inhabitants when the experience is so closely related to their own wholesale genocidal operations. However, while the shame was certainly there, trauma also played its part, but Sebald does not make clear which one is the decisive factor that led to the paper silence.
Studies done by Emma Dresler-Hawke with James Liu and by Dario Páez and others indicate that shame about the Holocaust is indeed a prevalent emotion inherent in Germans. Dresler-Hawke and Liu have examined how “three generations of Germans have been caught up in a collective psychological problem concerning the crimes of the Third Reich” (131). Dresler-Hawke and Liu found that Germans who do not feel ashamed about their country’s Nazi past are more likely to compare the Holocaust to the Allied bombing campaign (147). If Sebald’s reasoning is sound, this would mean that Germans still feel overwhelming shame since they do not dare to talk or write about the raids, let alone compare them to their own atrocities. Páez studies how collective shame and guilt are dealt with and separates the two emotions by the actions they are usually linked to. According to Páez, guilt leads to positive behaviour, because people who feel guilty are often moved to “reparation and apology,” (61) while people who feel ashamed exhibit “tendencies to escape, hide or distancing motivation” (61). The World War II generation of Germany must have felt both shame and guilt, but the following generations are likely to have felt shame, but much less guilt since they are by no means to blame. In addition, these generations also did not witness the havoc wreaked by the firestorms caused by the Allies and would be hampered only by the shame and not the trauma. Sebald’s unforgiving stance is therefore reasonable when it comes to the later generations of Germans. 
Sebald summarily dismisses a number of writers who have ventured to write about the bombings, because they have not adhered to Sebald’s preferred kind of representation. Heinrich Böll, Hermann Kassack, Hans Erich Nossack, and Peter de Mendelssohn (Sebald 46) have written about the destruction and post war life in a manner that secured Sebald’s approval for their work, but “the majority of German writers failed to dwell upon or even broach the aftermath of the air war” (Mendieta 9) as far as Sebald is concerned. Instead of merely criticising writers who have not written about the destruction, Sebald also criticises writers who have attempted to describe the atrocity, because he does “not trust the form [...] in which they are expressed” (81). Sebald maintains that there is a “right dimension of description of the German catastrophe” (81) and when a teacher points out young adult novels dealing with the subject Sebald immediately questions, despite not being familiar with the books, whether such low brow literature would be capable of reaching this dimension. Thus, Sebald’s argument evolves into criticism not about only about the quantity of literature on the subject, but also about the quality of the material that is out there. The dimension of description that Sebald demands is quite specific and requires more than simply reporting what was seen and experienced. According to him, literature should strive to provide a more comprehensive picture of the tragedy than mere eyewitness reports can provide.
Sebald’s criticism mainly consists of a call to approach the description of extreme history differently. To achieve this, eyewitness reports must be enriched by fiction (Sebald 25-26) to create the right kind of literature to deal with this form of German suffering (Sebald 81). In his new approach Sebald attempts to construct a visual map of the damage done to German cities by moral bombing. Sebald adds photos of the destruction and tries to capture the ruins in words. He describes that “42.8 cubic metres [of rubble] for every inhabitant of Dresden” (Sebald 4) was left after the Allied attack, but also notes that the actual meaning of these numbers is difficult to fathom (Sebald 4). The value of personal experience in literature is of limited value, according to Sebald, unless facts, figures and other viewpoints are added to produce as complete an account of the event as possible. In examining eyewitness reports of Sebald discovered that the same phrases were repeated time and time again and banalities abounded (24). This signified a verbal failure to adequately translate the experience to words. Sebald thinks that these clichés, while true, seem unreal, and that this damages the transference of the experience (24-5). The horror simply does not take root in the mind of the reader of eyewitness accounts, because the language fails to capture the experience. This is grounds for Sebald to discount stories from observers, because by themselves he judges these stories to be too emotional, intimate and limited. To arrive at the correct manner to describe firestorms and the razed buildings and the corpses and vermin left in the wake of the air raids, Sebald argues that these personal reports should be “supplemented by what a synoptic and artificial view reveals” (26). Todd Samuel Presner agrees with Sebald, but specifies the genre wherein this approach is possible as limited to the historical novel (342). Presner is convinced that because the nature of war has changed that literature about war has similarly altered (343). 















Chapter 3: Vonnegut’s Dresden Novel

In Slaughterhouse-Five Vonnegut condemns the bombing of Dresden. Vonnegut agrees with the foreword of British Air Marshall Sir Robert Saundby in The Destruction of Dresden that the bombing was “an unfortunate combination of circumstances,” (2007, xv) but Vonnegut is also quick to point out that this does not excuse the tragedy. In another foreword to The Destruction of Dresden Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker compares the victims of Dresden to the Allied soldiers killed in the Second World War (SF 187) and asserts that he feels more sympathy for the soldiers. Vonnegut considered the comparison despicable, because two wrongs do not make a right (Schatt 95). A comparison within Slaughterhouse-Five of the bombing of Dresden to the Jews in concentration camps is also not accepted by Vonnegut as either an excuse or a justification (10). British Air Marshall Saundby also theorises in his foreword to The Destruction of Dresden how the people in charge of the decision to bomb Dresden might not have known what it was they were doing (2007, xv). Vonnegut draws a science fiction parallel to robots dropping jellied gasoline on people, because they could not “imagine what was happening to people on the ground” (SF 168). These robots also have no conscience. Furthermore, Vonnegut criticises the fact that the Americans tried to keep the raid on Dresden a secret (SF 1, 191) and denies that the bombing had a purpose or a meaning. Josh Simpson states perfectly that “Slaughterhouse-Five show two things [...] with equally chilling clarity: what war and bad ideas can do to humanity” (267).
Slaughterhouse-Five was published in 1969, six years after The Destruction of Dresden by David Irving had been published and Vonnegut utilises misinformation from Irving’s book. The most glaring mistake of Vonnegut was to repeat the death toll number put forth by Irving when Vonnegut writes that “about one hundred and thirty thousand people” (SF, 165) died. However, at the time when Vonnegut wrote Slaughterhouse-Five Irving had not yet been discredited as a historian. Other erroneous assertions that can be found in Slaughterhouse-Five are that the bombing of Dresden was “worse [...] than Hiroshima” (Vonnegut 10) and that it was “the greatest massacre in European history” (Vonnegut 101). In the novel an English prisoner of war remarks to Billy Pilgrim, the protagonist of Slaughterhouse-Five, that “‘Dresden [...] is undefended and contains no war industries or troop concentrations of any importance’” (Vonnegut 146) and Billy himself observes that “Dresden was crammed with refugees” (Vonnegut 158). David Irving has made similar claims and it is unclear how much information Vonnegut has gleaned from The Destruction of Dresden and how much of it comes from his own experience. Vonnegut was forced to resort to the literature of others about the bombing of Dresden to reconstruct the event, because he could not remember a great deal himself, and unfortunately he chose Irving. In The Destruction of Dresden Irving describes how people, who sought refuge from the firestorm in water tanks, were boiled (2007, 212) and Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five contains a similar description (116). Vonnegut adds that the family of these victims had killed others and made candles of their victims’ fat (116). The rumours that the Germans were making soap and candles of the fat of their enemies already surfaced in the First World War and resurfaced in the Second World War. In the First World War the rumour was most likely invented by the British to demonise the Germans, but in the Second World War producing soap from human fat might have taken place experimentally (Shermer 117). Vonnegut mentions soap and candles being made of dead Jews three times in Slaughterhouse-Five. Vonnegut’s errors, whether they are deliberate or accidental, do succeed in strengthening the harsh, yet humorous tone of the novel.
The protagonist of Slaughterhouse-Five, Billy Pilgrim, has trouble remembering what happened at Dresden. The novel is a fictionalised account of Vonnegut’s wartime experience and Tony Tanner characterises it as a “moving meditation on the relationship between history and dreaming” (195). Billy is at times reliving the difficulties that Vonnegut faced with regards to his memories about the bombing of Dresden. There are two approaches to Billy’s time travelling, because it is a science fiction novel. Either Billy really does time travel involuntarily or Billy’s traumatic experiences in the war have led him to imagine that he can travel through time and that he was abducted by aliens. Josh Simpson argues that the Tralfamadorians stem from “an escape mechanism grounded in mental instability” (267) and this would mean they work counter to Billy’s time travelling. Billy’s time travelling often forces him to travel back to events surrounding the firestorm at Dresden, whereas his Tralfamadorian experiences are more light and humorous. Billy is barely aware of the damage the memory of what happened at Dresden has done to him. Vonnegut describes how “every so often, for no apparent reason” (SF 61) Billy would cry and how Billy almost collapses when he sees a barbershop quartet. It is upon seeing the barbershop quartet that Billy realises he has a “great big secret somewhere inside” (SF 173), but he does not yet know the lingering trauma of the firestorm at Dresden is causing this. It is only after careful consideration in Slaughterhouse-Five that Billy understands that Dresden is at the core of his misery (Vonnegut 177-8). Yet, this does not prevent Billy’s memories and experiences from revolving around Dresden as does the novel.
Vonnegut uses science fiction elements as a humorous diversion, but they often also emphasises the horror of Dresden. Richard Hinchcliffe, like Josh Simpson, thinks that Billy’s abduction is one of “his detailed escapist fantasies” (185) and that Billy alternates between these and “meandering within his personal memory” (184) vis-à-vis time travelling. Vonnegut said about aliens and such that it is “equivalent to bringing on the clowns every so often to lighten things up” (Standish 68). There is indeed a nice balance between Billy’s Tralfamadorian’ dealings and the often jarring Dresden-related time travel. It coincides with the cynical, yet accepting catchphrase of the novel “so it goes,” (SF 2) which is used for the first time after the narrator relates the death of someone’s mother in Dresden. The horrible fate of the woman stands in stark contrast to Vonnegut’s almost indifferent phrase. However, the phrase is not indifferent, but a symbol of how much in life is up to chance and how little control people exert over their own lives. It is a lesson Billy Pilgrim learns from the Tralfamadorians; everything that happens just happens. Worrying is often of very little use, especially about things that have already happened, like the firebombing of Dresden. Billy’s little forays into Tralfamadorian thinking do help him a bit in coming to grips with what happened at Dresden, though he realises he will never understand it. In his essay “Biafra: A People Betrayed” Vonnegut acknowledges that he usually resorts to humour in the face of tragedy, because he knows there is often very little else to do (147-8). Thus, Billy is unable to process the traumatic memory of the bombing of Dresden and tries to cope with the horror by joking about it.






















Chapter 4: Unclaimed Experience​[2]​

It took Kurt Vonnegut over 20 years to write Slaughterhouse-Five simply because he could not adequately remember what he had witnessed (Standish 94). This is discussed in the first chapter of Slaughterhouse-Five when the “author-character” (Hinchcliffe 184) describes the difficulties he faced in his attempt to write about Dresden. The author-character explains that he “thought it would be easy,” (SF 2) because of how it only involved giving an account of what he had experienced. Instead, however, he discovered that he remembered very little. In an interview with David Standish Vonnegut admitted that the bombing of Dresden “was a complete blank” (94) and that some of his friends who had been there could not remember it either (94). What Vonnegut intended to do was “to narrate the unnarratable,” (Whitehead 4) but he had not realised that the experience had been so traumatic as to be almost impossible to put into words. Anne Whitehead classifies this dilemma as the classic contradiction inherent to trauma fiction. “[I]f trauma comprises an event or experience which overwhelms the individual and resists language or representation” (Whitehead 3) then it is a wonder the genre exists. “[A]s far as [his] memory bank was concerned the center had been pulled right out,” (Standish 94) therefore Vonnegut was forced to base much of his writing on other sources, which might have been for the best. In The Holocaust on Trial D.D. Guttenplan explains that “memory is a terribly unreliable guide,” (307) which is true, but even more so in the case of traumatic memories. Traumatic experiences fall victim to repression as Vonnegut discovered and Slaughterhouse-Five’s narrative structure mirrors the struggle between the impulse to suppress and the unresolved trauma’s determination to surface.
Vonnegut’s trauma might be mild compared to the trauma of the German victims of area bombing. The raid at Dresden was not directed against Vonnegut, he was there purely by chance. The target was the population of Dresden, whether the Allied forces want to admit this or not. Vonnegut must have heard the bombs dropping, but he did not see them falling. He was not a witness to the firestorm that swirled through the streets devouring men, women, and children alike. He did not see friends and family dying. He did not hear his loved ones scream. A majority of the inhabitants of Dresden must have seen and heard the most terrible things during the raid on Dresden. Germans in Hamburg and other cities subjected to moral bombing lived through similar horrors. Aside from mental trauma, the victims also experienced physical pain and Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain chronicles how difficult it is to express this (3). “Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it,” (Scarry 4) like trauma destroys memory. On the other hand, Scarry argues that trauma “is susceptible to verbal objectification,” (11) but she also thinks the process is never easy. Frederic Jameson takes the argument even further by voicing “the suspicion that war is ultimately unrepresentable” (1533). Vonnegut came out of his hiding place after the bombs had stopped falling and the fires had stopped raging. As Jameson stresses, in Slaughterhouse-Five the disaster takes place “offstage” (1544) and it was only the sight of Dresden after the bombing that Vonnegut saw, while he helped to dig up the corpses, but this was enough to evoke amnesia. Is it strange then that the Germans who survived the bombing of their cities, and who thought they were partly to blame for the attacks, suffered a more severe case of amnesia? In some cases the forgetting may have been deliberate, but if Vonnegut struggled for twenty years to remember Dresden, it is only reasonable to assume that the Germans were even more traumatised and experienced even more difficulty in accessing the collective memory of surviving the raids. This naturally would have resulted in trouble to commit their accounts of the atrocity to paper. 
The protagonist of Slaughterhouse-Five is unaware he is traumatised until he suffers a belated reaction to the bombing of Dresden. Cathy Caruth details in “Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History”  how initially the traumatic event is not fully experienced and the significance of its horror to the witness goes almost unnoticed and it is only after perhaps months or years have passed that the witness can be subjected to repeated unwanted memories of the event (181). This is exactly what happens to Billy, who does not at first understand why he sometimes cries and when he discovers a mental capacity to break down he thinks he harbours a heretofore unknown mystery locked inside (SF 173). It is difficult to believe that someone can be present at the bombing of Dresden, yet be unaware the memory of it might be traumatic, but the delayed reaction partly accounts for this. During the Second World War Billy does only cry once, about the condition of some horses, (SF 197) but after the war Billy is suddenly prone to crying without knowing why (SF 197). In order to stop the memory from wreaking havoc on Billy’s life he has to relive it.
The repression of his Dresden memory is what leads to Billy being haunted by the experience. Billy continues to approach the memory of Dresden, because it is a piece of his past that proves “too traumatic to recollect and yet too formative to leave behind” (Cacicedo 359). Vonnegut accomplishes Billy’s circling by having him involuntarily travel through time and each time coming one step closer to the bombing of Dresden. The time travelling device, not a literal but a figurative plot-device, operates along the lines of Sigmund Freud’s theory about trauma, formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud discovered a boy unconsciously re-enacting a traumatic scene over and over again (9) and deduced that it is a symptom of neurosis when someone is unaware that he is constantly reliving a traumatic event (30). Cathy Caruth also examines the phenomenon in Trauma: Explorations in Memory and she agrees that for an event to be traumatic its “assimilat[ion]” (4) has to be incomplete. Thus, a memory can be traumatic, but the recipient is not truly traumatised unless he or she is “possessed by an image or event” (Trauma: Explorations in Memory 5). The bombing of Dresden must have been a horrible thing to experience and Billy also fits the description of someone who was traumatised by the experience. Billy almost certainly suffers from PTSD and will have to fully undergo the traumatic memory to negate its damaging effects.
The unwelcome reliving of memories related to Dresden is what dictates the messy structure of Slaughterhouse-Five. According to Anne Whitehead, Vonnegut follows a familiar method of writing about trauma, because “[n]ovelists have frequently found that the impact of trauma can only adequately be represented by mimicking its forms and symptoms” (3). This means that time and the natural order of events disappear (Whitehead 3) and that a cyclical narrative arises. Eduardo Mendieta agrees that in trauma fiction the “unhinged” (20) narrative and feeling of being “set adrift in the void of timelessness” (20) are essential to construct a new frame of mind wherein the traumatic experience can be understood (20). Not only does Vonnegut mirror the methodology of traumatic neuroses, he also provides the reader with a glimpse into the strangeness of witnessing an atrocity. It is the combination of mental shock and awe that produces the effect; produced on a smaller scale when someone is briefly afraid or excited. In the case of a major traumatic experience, however, the shock completely transforms the moment and thus the memory. Hans Eric Nossack, who was present at the bombing of Hamburg in 1943, describes how during the attack “time [...] feels useless” (63). Its linear nature is shattered; it moves forwards and backwards at lightning speeds or slows the present down to sluggish seconds that seems like minutes or causes everything to seem to happen at the same time (Mendieta 20). Cathy Caruth agrees that in regards to trauma “[t]he pathology [...] consists solely in the structure of its experience or reception,” (Trauma: Explorations in Memory 4) which Vonnegut has succeeded in wonderfully duplicating in Slaughterhouse-Five. It is not until Billy is able to remember the bombing of Dresden consciously and completely that he will have any hope of ridding himself from the influence of the traumatic experience on his life.
The concrete memory of the bombing of Dresden does not resurface until the end of Slaughterhouse-Five and Billy does not relive it by travelling through time: he remembers it. Billy effectively claims the experience, as did Vonnegut by writing his Dresden novel after so many years. Vonnegut writes Billy remembering the bombing that caused his trauma as a cathartic experience. Billy tells the story of the tragedy to Montana Wildhack, (SF 179) realises his crying is related to Dresden (SF 197) and discusses the bombing of Dresden with Rumfoord (SF 198). It is the pathology of trauma that causes Billy to skirt the corners of his memory and that is what drives him insane, yet, at the same time, his time travelling trips are “subconscious attempts to confront the horrors his mind submerged during the war” (Hinchcliffe 193). Alberto Cacicedo detects a similar mechanism at work with Vonnegut himself; he drinks at night, but while “the alcohol deadens the memory” (360) his calls to old military friends “seek to arouse” (360) the memory of Dresden. Thus, the neurosis is at the same time damaging and therapeutic and it allows Billy and Vonnegut the possibility of exorcising their demons when they finally claim the experience.
While Vonnegut effectively exorcised his Dresden demons, as far as trauma can ever be cast out, the lack of German literature about the bombings suggests that Germans had not yet managed to overcome their collective trauma. W.G. Sebald asserts that one of the explanations for why German literature has been unconcerned with the ruined cities of Germany is that trauma has prevented German writers from accessing and transferring the memory. Eduardo Mendieta categorises Sebald’s criticism as his “indictment of German writers for their failure to have dealt [...] with the national trauma of the air war” (4). Mendieta argues that the “self-imposed silence” (8) of those affected by the bombings added to the trauma (8) and that the lack of German literature about the destruction of Germany`s cities has led to an “inability to mourn” (8). Mendieta borrows the phrase from Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich’s book The Inability to Mourn, first published in 1967 and written about the failure of Germans to come to terms with their Nazi past. Since mourning is an important stage of working through a painful period or memory, Mendieta is correct when he assumes the reluctance of the German people to be confronted with what they had done and what they had suffered hindered the process of healing and traumatised the collective and individual German further. J.J. Long and Anne Whitehead agree with this thesis that Sebald and Mendieta share that claims that “German victims of the bombing could not have access to their experiences and that they could not be integrated into narrative memory” (Long 14). Thus, ordinary Germans and German writers who were left homeless or witnessed the Allied bombings were according to Sebald, Mendieta, Long, and Whitehead unable to translate their experience to words and ultimately to literature. Wilfried Wilms concurs when he emphasises how “Sebald [...] describes the absence of memory as a defence mechanism” (178). It is ironic that what started out as a barrier against the memory ended up acerbating the traumatic experience. In “Air War and Literature” Sebald blames the lack of literature about the bombings for the relative ignorance of the following generations and also thinks this is why the bombings does not really occupy a place in the “collective consciousness” (4). He feels that the experience of the moral bombing of German cities has been “largely obliterated from the retrospective understanding of those affected” (Sebald 4) and that it “never became an experience capable of public decipherment” (Sebald 4). 
Yet, Sebald’s harsh criticism of Germany’s censorship regarding the raids is difficult to reconcile with his understanding of trauma theory, because what he describes as an “almost perfectly functioning mechanism of repression” (12) was not voluntary. It was not enforced from outside, but from within and as far as trauma goes reluctance to confront the memory plays a much smaller part than the nature of trauma which prevents the memory from being accessed and being confronted. Sebald acknowledges that for many victims of the bombing campaign the memory of this horrible occurrence “[exceeds] what is tolerable,” (79) but Sebald is nonetheless dismissing of eyewitness reports and the trauma that witnessing brings with it. After reading a study from Dr. Hans Joachim Schröder, which contains interviews with German soldiers about the Second World War, Sebald accuses Schröder of “largely [ignoring] the psychological aspect of the recall of traumatic experiences” (80). Obviously, Sebald grasps the difficulty of dealing with trauma, but he places the blame for the failure to vocalise the experience more with the person, or the nation as a whole, than with the character of trauma.









Chapter 5: Controversy, Irving’s Lies, and Revisionism

Jörg Friedrich stated about the history of the air raids on Germany in the Second World War and how they will be remembered that “[a]ll generations appropriate history tactically for their purposes” (187). D.D. Guttenplan similarly argues that “[h]istory [...] is always a matter of politics” (68) and it is true that history is often dictated by the victorious. However, in the case of the destruction of German cities the defeated were the ones to contribute heavily to the memory of the attacks. The Americans and British may have decided to put moral bombing into a much more positive light than the strategy merits, but the Germans have nearly forgotten about the suffering the bombings caused. Some writers, amongst them Friedrich, sought to remedy this amnesia, but they often encounter resistance against depicting the Germans as victims and suggesting that the Allied forces committed a moral crime. W.G. Sebald’s lectures about the lack of literature about the raids were given in 1997. J.J. Long and Anne Whitehead argue that at that time vocalising the hardships of the Germans was the subject of a serious debate (“Introduction,” W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion, 5-6). Almost ten years later Friedrich’s The Fire was criticised for the same reason; the world seems not yet ready to sympathise with the losses the Germans endure during the war. Whenever a work detailing the destruction of Germany at the hands of the British appears controversy surrounds the subject.
One particular issue regarding the raids will never be fully resolved: the exact number of deaths. The debate about the death toll caused by the bombing of Dresden is still ongoing (Taylor, “How Many Died in the Bombing of Dresden?”). Kurt Vonnegut, who was present in Dresden at the time of the bombing, and Sven Lindqvist claim that bodies completely turned to ashes in the heat of the firestorm, (Lindqvist 102) while other sources, such as a special commission headed by the military historian Rolf-Dieter Mueller state that the firestorm was not able to obliterate corpses (Pancevski). The former claim naturally allows for a higher death toll than can be substantiated. Someone who remains convinced of a death toll far exceeding 25,000 without corroborating evidence is British historian David Irving. When David Irving’s The Destruction of Dresden was published in 1963 the subject of the bombing of Dresden was controversial, because of the relative insignificance of the city as a military target and the fact that it was barely defended. Irving’s book added to the controversy, because Irving claimed the death toll was much higher than was generally believed (Evans 10). 
The death toll of the attack on Dresden as Irving presented it was founded on speculation and dubious evidence. In 1963 Irving claimed the death toll was 135,000. The accepted death toll at the time was 35,000. In an interview on 29 April 1963 in the Daily Sketch, a British tabloid newspaper, Irving explained that the first digit of the actual death toll number had been deleted to appease the Russians (Evans 159). There was no evidence to support this assumption; it was simply speculation on Irving’s part. In 1964 Irving discovered an official German report, named TB 47, which put the number of deaths in Dresden as high as  202,040 (Evans 162). Irving accepted this new number immediately and boasted of his discovery. His conduct regarding TB 47 was utterly unbecoming of a serious historian. Firstly, he had not discovered the document. Max Seydewitz had produced evidence of the existence of TB 47 and Seydewitz had labelled it a fake in 1955 (Evans 161). Irving knew this and had agreed with the assessment in a 1963 Kimber edition of The Destruction of Dresden (207). Secondly, TB 47’s authenticity was never verified. It was as Richard J. Evans states “a carbon copy of a typed copy of a typed copy of a handwritten transcript of an extract from an unknown document, unauthenticated by any distinguishing marks such as a signature or an official stamp of any description” (162-3) and a responsible historian would not have included it as evidence. If Irving was intent on including it he should have at least cast serious doubts on the trustworthiness of the document. Yet, Irving based his death toll of Dresden on TB 47 alone and voiced an unwarranted faith in the validity of the document. Finally, Irving steadfastly ignored reports that TB 47 was false and that the death toll could not have possibly been so high. 
As early as 1965 Irving was in the possession of information that would have made any reasonable historian question TB 47. In January 1965 Irving received a letter from Max Fundack, the man who Irving credited with providing him with TB 47, who protested against everything Irving had written. Fundack refuted Irving’s claims that Fundack was the Chief Medical Officer in Dresden at the time of the bombing and that Fundack had firsthand knowledge of the death toll (Evans 163). Additionally, TB 47 had come into Fundack’s possession via acquaintances and he would not vouch for the authenticity of the document (Evans 163-4). This did nothing to stop Irving’s promotion of TB 47. Neither did Irving’s correspondence in January and February of 1965 with Theo Miller, “a member of the Dresden Clearing Staff,” (Evans 172) deter Irving’s misplaced confidence in TB 47’s death toll estimate. Miller, who had been partly responsible for clearing the corpses and who remembered records of the operation, put the number of deaths around 35,000 in a letter to Irving on 7 February 1965 (Evans 172). In the middle of 1966 the Final Report of the Dresden police on the death toll was sent to Irving. Its evidence made a death toll exceeding 25,000 extremely unlikely (Evans 175). Contrary to TB 47, this document’s authenticity was confirmed (Evans 175). Irving was forced to admit the death toll was much lower than he had claimed and, subsequently in 1977, it was proven beyond a doubt that TB 47 had been tampered with by the Nazis; they had added a zero at the end (Evans 178-9). However, Irving, who in the 2007 Focal Point edition of The Destruction of Dresden praises how  “[t]he Germans [...] kept records of all air raid losses with meticulous care,” (50) suddenly doubted the ability of the Germans to count (Evans 177-8). Aside from the fact that it would require considerably less time, effort, and expertise to count 25,000 corpses than to count 202,040 corpses, it seems Irving only trusts German reports when these reports support a high death toll. 
Furthermore, long after the Final Report surfaced Irving continued to perpetuate the lie that 25,000 deaths was not an accurate number of deaths. On a television show in 1986 he claimed the death toll was four times as high (Evans 188) and on another television show in 1991 he claimed it was five times as high (Evans 189). In the 2007 edition of The Destruction of Dresden Irving admits that the estimation of 6,865 cremated corpses in the Final Report “seems the more probable figure” (239) as opposed to the 68,650 that were supposedly cremated according to TB 47. Irving also acknowledges that TB 47 is most likely a Nazi forgery, (2007, 240) but in stark contrast to this rectification stands his liberal quotations from a Nazi diarist. This diarist states twice that more than 200,000 people were killed in Dresden during the bombing (Irving, 2007, 214-5) and Irving provides no context for these figures. He does not comment on the questionable nature of a Nazi diarist, nor does he disclaim the figures.
	Defenders of the bombing campaign against Germany use the Holocaust with the aim to diminish the atrociousness of moral bombing. The British and American government knew about the Holocaust before the end of the war. The Americans knew at the end of 1942 (Breitman 231) and the British had received information to the affect of systematic killings of Jews and even reports about gas chambers prior to August 1942 (Evans 138-9). Instead of publicising this information they kept it a secret. The Allies were at first simply unwilling to believe these reports, probably partly motivated by anti-Semitism, which was on the rise in all of Europe and partly because they were afraid of spreading false information. However, in 1943, “when there were still more than two million Jews left to rescue,” (Lindqvist 98) and the British and Americans knew exactly what was happening at extermination camps they still did not try to prevent the Holocaust. Instead of bombing the gas chambers or the railroads leading to the camps, (Lindqvist 100) which they flatly refused to do, (Guttenplan 156) they continued to bomb German cities. Thus, a defence of moral bombing cannot rest on the Holocaust, because nothing was done to try and put a stop to it. The insistence to continue with moral bombing actually aided the genocide. 
The bombing of German civilians is not in any way, shape or form pardoned by the fact that the Nazis were responsible for the Holocaust. The systematic murder of 6 million Jews with the aim to exterminate them, simply because of their race was abhorrent, as was the murder of 5 million others who were also considered Untermenschen. The fact that in the Holocaust vastly more lives were lost, that its victims were much more defenceless than can be said of the majority of the bombing victims and that it was not the intention of Bomber Command to exterminate the Germans (Lindqvist 97) does not change the immoral nature of moral bombing. It is tantamount to, as A.C. Grayling rightly states, suggesting that because a more horrible crime was committed a less severe crime should be condoned (251). 
Over the years Irving’s reputation as a historian suffered, because he became an anti-Semite and a Holocaust denier; people like him often call themselves revisionists. However, it was not until the Irving vs. Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books trial in the spring of 2000 that Irving’s reputation as a serious historian was destroyed and the full extent of his lies was revealed. His mistake in regards to TB 47 was known before he sued Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books for libel, but only then the malicious intent behind this mistake and several of Irving’s other fabrications about the bombing of Dresden were fully unmasked. Nonetheless, Irving was starting to encounter difficulties in finding publishers for his books and this probably prompted him to sue Lipstadt. In addition, Irving was extremely fond of the spotlights and he must also have relished the opportunity to sow doubts about the Holocaust. Deborah Lipstadt had published Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory with Penguin Books in 1993 and in it she named David Irving as a Holocaust denier who misrepresented evidence. In order to defend themselves Lipstadt and Penguin Books decided to “claim justification,” (Evans 34) which meant they would have to prove that the allegations made against Irving in Lipstadt’s book were true. One of the most important experts of the defence when it came to discrediting Irving as a historian was without a doubt Richard J. Evans. Evans spent the next two years reading and researching specific works of Irving, including The Destruction of Dresden, and cataloguing Irving’s mistakes.
Revisionists like Irving attempt to equate the bombing of Germany’s cities with the Holocaust: this is called the “moral equivalency argument” (Shermer 105). In the 2000 trial Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books needed to prove the Holocaust took place and that David Irving knew this, but that he falsified evidence to be able to deny its existence. The Destruction of Dresden was written at least ten years before Irving’s political views started to radicalise and before he came to believe that the Holocaust was a hoax. Yet, it was in The Destruction of Dresden that Irving first planted some of the seeds needed to discredit the Holocaust. To understand how Irving could take advantage of the bombing of Dresden to minimise the enormity of the atrocity of the Holocaust it should first be examined what it means to be a Holocaust denier. 
According to Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Holocaust deniers claim that gas chambers were not used for the mass murder of Jews; (100) some even purport that there never were gas chambers (58). Another popular claim is that Jews were only killed sporadically and that there was no “well-organised extermination program” (Shermer 100) with the aim of exterminating the European Jews. The part of Holocaust denial central to Irving’s deception in The Destruction of Dresden is that not around 6 million Jews, but a far smaller number died. Their estimations of the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust vary from “’only’ one or two million” (Shermer 174) to around 100,000. This attempt of the Holocaust deniers to deflate the number of Jews killed serves to be able to draw a parallel between the Allied bombing and the Holocaust. In the 2007 edition of The Destruction of Dresden Irving states that the raids on Dresden “cost up to a hundred thousand people their lives” (167). 







Chapter 6: Sebald vs. Vonnegut

There are several reasons why Sebald and Vonnegut have decided to approach the matter of moral bombing differently. Vonnegut was present in Dresden during the firestorm and saw the destruction it left in its wake, while Sebald did not witness such an attack. Vonnegut is American and thus feels culpable for America’s part in the bombing campaign and Sebald is liable to feel the national German shame over the Holocaust. Aside from that they are also vastly different writers; Sebald is a journalist and historian, while Vonnegut has derisively been described as a science fiction writer. The most important distinction between them is what they want to accomplish with their work and this is what has caused their descriptions of the general aerial attack to be so dissimilar.
Vonnegut is focused on his own trauma. It is Vonnegut’s repulsion towards what he witnessed at Dresden that prompted him to write Slaughterhouse-Five as an anti-war novel. “Mainly I think [writers] should be [...] agents of change,” (WFG 213) Vonnegut stated once and he wrote about Dresden with the intention to make people aware of the futility of war. Due to his faulty memory the account of the attack and the structure of the novel is scattered, while his credentials as a science fiction writer assure that there is plenty of fiction and humour present in the novel. Josh Simpson states perfectly that “Slaughterhouse-Five shows two things [...] with equally chilling clarity: what war and bad ideas can do to humanity,” (267) which is exactly what Vonnegut set out to do. Vonnegut did not want to write a war novel that glorified and glamorised war, but a novel that exposed the harsh realities of war (SF 14). 
Sebald attempts to find a literary mode to combat the trauma of an entire nation. The introduction of a new system for the representation of the destruction of the German cities is what Sebald strives for. This new method in turn must be primarily concerned with the passing on of history. “[T]he role of writer as bearer of social memory” (Mendieta 4) and “the role of literature as a vehicle for remembrance, for working through a national trauma” (Mendieta 9) are central to Sebald and for precisely this reason it is his intention to construct as complete a picture of the bombings as possible.
Sebald thinks remembering the past is all-important. To provide a vivid account of the aerial attacks Sebald utilises eyewitness reports, archive footage, photos and everything else he can find. The result is almost more visual than verbal; his description of the firebombing of Hamburg in 1943 reads as if a camera is panning down to witness the destruction and he zooms in and out at will. The reason that Sebald criticises other German writers is that in his opinion they have recanted on their responsibility to narrate the past. Mendieta thinks that this is why Sebald in the Zurich lectures comes down so hard on German writers; Sebald feels they have neglected their duty by not striving harder to bring the bombings into the public eye (Mendieta 9). Mendieta argues that precisely because the traumatic experience of firestorms and Allied raids is unnarratable it should be, or at least attempted to be, narrated (8). Yet, though books were written by some German authors about the subject, it never became as significant a topic in German literature as it should have been. Sebald thinks literature should not only function as a way for writers to work through their own traumas, but it should provide a means for battling “a national trauma” (Mendieta 9). Literature should serve to transfer the knowledge of the raids of German cities and its horrors to later generations, according to Sebald. Long and Whitehead also recognise the pressure Sebald puts on literature as “a vehicle of social memory” (Mendieta 10) and how Sebald seems to thinks literature should involve the “transmission of historical knowledge and personal and collective memory” (Long 5). Sebald criticises German writers because they “would not or could not” (78) translate the effect of the moral bombing on Germany, but the question that he does not answer is whether they should. 
Vonnegut, on the contrary, one point in Slaughterhouse-Five explains that we “aren’t supposed to look back” (22) and he adds that he is “certainly not going to do it anymore” (22). He did rely on other sources, but also on his own memory. Slaughterhouse-Five is not the sentimental cliché that Sebald thinks survivor reports often dissolve into, but the reason for this is unclear. Vonnegut is an exceptional writer; that might be an explanation, but perhaps his traumatic forgetting of the event was even more important. It is difficult to verbally neutralise the horror of Dresden, especially so because Vonnegut’s memories about Dresden were almost gone. Despite or because of his amnesia, Slaughterhouse-Five provides a stunning description of the aftermath of the firestorm in Dresden that is both intelligent and clear. Aside from verbally describing how Dresden was destroyed, Vonnegut also delves into the representation of traumatic events with the jumbled narrative structure of his novel. Its narrator and main characters are traumatised and simultaneously gravitate towards the disaster and are repelled by the memory of it. This dictates the nature of time in the novel. Time is of little consequence since the main character is travelling back and forth through time. Vonnegut represents the bombing of Dresden sparsely, because Slaughterhouse-Five is a discourse on trauma and memory with Dresden used as an example. 
























The representation of extreme history is a problematic issue. The right mode of description is difficult to find because a delicate balance between objective information and emotional accounts is needed. Frederic Jameson sums up the matter best when he explains that the description of war is “navigable only by formal innovation [...] and not by any stable narrative convention” (1547). History is stable, but the representation of history is not. Personal motives can influence the language. Irving argues that the killing of Jews by the Germans and the killing of Germans by means of moral bombing were both forms of innocenticide. Mendieta speaks of urbicide with regards to the Allied air raids, because residential areas were targeted. Sebald carefully suggests that the bombing campaign against Germany consisted of culturecide, whether or not this was the ultimate goal (19). These terms are important because they influence the opinion of the reader about the bombing campaign. The term innocenticide is favoured by Irving, because it allows him to compare moral bombing to the Holocaust. The culturecide that Sebald describes is also a dangerous term, because it implies a desire of the Allies to destroy the German culture, as the Germans tried to destroy the Jewish race. Urbicide is perhaps the best term, because it only betrays the intention to destroy urban centres and their inhabitants, which is exactly what Bomber Command set out to do. The language of bombing is perhaps even more obtuse, since the terms moral bombing, carpet bombing, area bombing, obliteration bombing and mass bombing are used almost as if they were interchangeable, though every term evokes another response.
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